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INTRODUCTION 
International law has long considered the regulation of abortion 
to be a prerogative of the State. In recent years, however, international 
human rights bodies have begun to consider the conformity of 
domestic abortion regulations with States’ human rights obligations. 
This Article identifies and examines a notable trend among human 
rights bodies: namely, their willingness to find that denying or 
obstructing a woman’s access to abortion can amount to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment (“CIDT”) under multiple human 
rights treaties. This Article identifies two lines of reasoning emerging 
from human rights bodies in this area. First, human rights bodies have 
found that States can be responsible for cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment inflicted on women who are harassed and denied services 
that are legally available to them under the State’s laws. Second, 
human rights bodies have found that the application of restrictive 
abortion laws themselves may inflict CIDT by depriving women of an 
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abortion in cases such as rape or when the woman’s life or health is 
seriously threatened.  
I argue that these findings reflect an understanding that certain 
restrictions on abortion—or the State’s failure to act to prevent de 
facto restrictions—are unjustifiable and disproportionate to lawful 
State aims. They also demonstrate a limited but important recognition 
that deprivations of autonomy in the reproductive rights context can 
lead to the kind of pain and suffering that is unacceptable in modern 
societies. At the same time, I argue that human rights bodies should 
further strengthen their understanding of women’s autonomy interests 
in this context, particularly the ways in which the frustration of 
women’s reproductive autonomy can inflict severe and unacceptable 
pain or suffering tantamount to CIDT. Such recognition, I argue, is 
essential to ensuring that women’s human rights are fully recognized 
and protected in the context of reproductive health and reproductive 
decision-making.  
 The prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment is one of the most well established obligations under 
international law. While traditionally associated with extreme 
physical or psychological abuse committed against detainees by State 
actors in State-run facilities, the concept of torture and CIDT has 
expanded significantly in the past two decades, along with the 
justifications for holding a State responsible under international law 
for the commission of such acts. Torture and CIDT are increasingly 
viewed as acts that occur not only within State detention but also in 
everyday settings—from public and private healthcare facilities to the 
home. Human rights bodies have found violations of the right to be 
free from torture or CIDT in many cases of violence that were once 
considered outside the scope of the prohibition, including rape,1 
domestic violence,2 coercive sterilization,3 female genital mutilation,4 

1. See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 23718/94 (1997) (acknowledging for the 
first time that an act of rape could constitute torture); Raquel Martí de Mejía v. Peru, Case 
10.970, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.91, doc. 7 (1996). See 
generally ALICE EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 219–29 (2011) (analyzing human rights standards on rape and torture) 
[hereinafter EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN]; Felice D. Gaer, Rape as a Form of 
Torture: The Experience of the Committee Against Torture, 15 N.Y. CITY. L. REV. 293 (2012); 
Clare McGlynn, Rape, Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights, 58 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 565 (2009). 
2. See, e.g., Eremia v. Moldova, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 3564/11,  ¶¶ 48–66 (2013) (applying 
Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to 
a case of domestic violence); Opuz v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 158–76 (2009) 
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and corporal punishment of children.5 Furthermore, while state 
responsibility for acts of torture or CIDT traditionally attached only 
when the act was committed by State agents or those under their 
control, human rights bodies today recognize that States may be held 
responsible—and accountable—for acts of torture or CIDT 
committed by private actors when the State has failed to take 
appropriate steps to prevent and punish these acts.6 These changes 
have set the stage for a recent and novel development in this area of 
human rights law: namely the recognition that, in certain 
circumstances, acts by public or private individuals to deny or 
obstruct a woman’s access to abortion can cause such severe pain or 
suffering that they amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, 
triggering state responsibility under international law.  
International law has long considered the regulation of abortion 
to be an area of domestic concern and a prerogative, at least to some 
extent, of the State. While the European Court of Human Rights has a 
long-standing jurisprudence on abortion, primarily under Article 8—

(same); Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by 
States Parties, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008). See generally Rhonda Copelon, 
Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 291 (1993–1994).  
3. See, e.g., I.G. & others. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 15966/04,  ¶¶ 112–26 (2013); 
N.B. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 29518/10, ¶¶ 71–88 (2012); V.C. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. No. 18968/07, ¶¶ 100–20 (2012); Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of 
the Committee Against Torture: Slovakia, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SVK/CO/2 (2009); Comm. 
Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Peru, ¶ 
23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/PER/CO/4 (2006); Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Czech Republic, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/CR/32/2 (2004); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Slovakia, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/SVK (2003); Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men and 
Women), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000) [hereinafter HRC, General 
Comment No. 28]; Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations by the Human Rights 
Committee: Peru, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/PER (2000); Human Rights Comm., 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Japan, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (1998).  
4. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against 
Torture: Indonesia, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/IDN/CO/2 (2008); Comm. Against Torture, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Kenya, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/KEN/CO/1 (2008); HRC, General Comment No. 28, supra note 3, ¶ 11. 
5. See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25599/94 (1998) (finding that a minor 
who was repeatedly caned with force by his stepfather had experienced inhuman or degrading 
treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights). 
6. See infra Part I.B; see also EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 1, at 
237–52 (describing the development of a “due diligence” standard in human rights law to hold 
States accountable for acts of torture or CIDT committed by private actors).  
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right to private life—of the European Convention on Human Rights,7 
it has only been in the last ten to fifteen years that other human rights 
bodies have begun to consider the legality of domestic abortion 
regulations under a State’s human rights obligations.8 These bodies 
have not found an explicit “right to choose” in human rights law, but 
have concluded that certain restrictions or barriers to accessing 
abortion may seriously undermine a woman’s human rights, including 
her rights to life, health, privacy, and non-discrimination, and that 
fulfillment of the associated right may therefore require reforms to 
domestic laws.9  
Framing acts that deny or obstruct women’s access to abortion as 
forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is part of a decades-
long effort by feminist scholars and advocates to advance 
international recognition of female-specific forms of pain and 

7. The now-defunct European Commission on Human Rights first considered whether 
domestic abortion regulations violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
in 1976. See Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 6959/75, 3 
Eur. Comm’n H.R. 244, ¶¶ 61–63 (1976). 
8. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (“ICPD”) played 
a significant role in putting reproductive rights on the international human rights agenda. In 
fact, the ICPD Programme of Action, adopted at the 1994 conference, was the first 
international consensus documents in which States agreed that reproductive rights were human 
rights already recognized in domestic and international law. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION 
FUND (UNFPA), INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
adopted Sept. 1994, at 60, ¶ 7.3, available at http://www.unfpa.org/publications/international-
conference-population-and-development-icpd-programme-action. For an overview of how 
human rights bodies have addressed the intersection of abortion and human rights, see HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, DECISIONS DENIED: WOMEN’S ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVES AND 
ABORTION IN ARGENTINA, 66 (June 2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/argentina0605/argentina0605.pdf (noting in 2005 that UN 
Treaty Monitoring Bodies had “produced a significant body of jurisprudence regarding 
abortion in over 122 concluding observations concerning at least ninety-three countries”); 
Center for Reproductive Rights, Bringing Rights to Bear: Abortion and Human Rights (2008), 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/BRB_abortion_hr_revised_3.09_WEB.PDF. 
9. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Commc'n No. 
22/2009, L.C. v. Peru, 17 Oct. 2011, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 (2011) (finding that 
under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, Peru 
was obligated to amend its laws to allow women to obtain abortion in cases of rape and sexual 
assault, establish a mechanism to ensure the availability of those services, and guarantee 
access to abortion when a woman’s life or health is in danger); Human Rights Comm., 
Commc'n. No. 1153/2003, K.L. v. Peru, 24 Oct. 2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 
(2005); HRC, General Comment No. 28, supra note 3, ¶ 10; Comm. on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Senegal, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62 (2001). 
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suffering as serious human rights violations.10 In particular, feminist 
scholars have critiqued the prohibition on torture and CIDT as being 
largely constructed on the basis of a male paradigm—that of 
“interrogating, punishing or intimidating detainees,” generally 
male11—and for ignoring the contexts in which women experience 
comparable pain or suffering. By analyzing women’s experiences as 
forms of torture or CIDT, scholars and advocates have attempted to 
reorient the concept to “encompass those forms of violations of 
dignity and physical integrity that are most relevant to the lived 
experiences of women.”12 Given that the prohibition on CIDT is a 
non-derogable right13 and potentially a jus cogens norm,14 framing 
women’s experiences of pain or suffering as forms of CIDT 
highlights the imperative of addressing women’s suffering as a human 
rights issue and demands greater accountability from States for their 
role in such suffering.15    

10. See RONLI SIFRIS, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, TORTURE AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGING THE MASCULINISATION OF TORTURE 19–23 (2014). The 
efforts of human rights advocates to frame denial of abortion as a form of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment—or even torture in particularly severe cases—follows a line of thinking 
put forward by international feminist scholars in the 1990s who argued that rape was 
sufficiently severe to amount to torture. See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, On Torture: A 
Feminist Perspective on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 7 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993); Hilary 
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International 
Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 628–30 (1991).  
11. SIFRIS, supra note 10, at 19. 
12. Id. at 10. 
13. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (prohibiting derogations from Article 7); see also Human 
Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) (noting that 
Article 7 of the ICCPR cannot be limited, even by public emergency, extenuating 
circumstances, or orders from a public authority). The European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) has held that the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, regardless of the conduct of the victim, the 
nature of the offense, or the existence of a threat to national security. See D. v. United 
Kingdom, 30240/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 47 (1997); see also CAT, General Comment No. 2, supra 
note 2, ¶¶ 5–6. 
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 
cmts. d-i, §102 cmt. k (1987); see also Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary 
Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 331 (2009). 
15. For example, Catharine MacKinnon has noted that relying on the “recognized 
profile” of torture could advance women’s rights because torture carries effective legal 
sanctions and penalties. See EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 1, at 212 
(citing MacKinnon, On Torture, supra note 10, at 25). 
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Human rights bodies have become increasingly receptive to 
claims that denying or obstructing a woman’s access to abortion—or 
related services that are legal prerequisites for abortion16—amounts to 
CIDT in a number of circumstances. Yet there has been little critical 
assessment of these emerging standards or attempts to understand 
how human rights bodies evaluate the pain or suffering that women 
experience when they are denied an abortion. This Article seeks to fill 
that gap. Part I begins by providing an overview of the prohibition 
against CIDT in international human rights law as well as State 
obligations to prevent, punish, and redress victims for such violations 
of their human rights. Part II examines a number of cases, individual 
communications, and other standard-setting documents, such as 
Concluding Observations to States, in which human rights bodies 
have addressed the nexus between denying a woman access to an 
abortion and the infliction of CIDT. I identify two key trends in this 
area. First, human rights bodies, particularly the European Court of 
Human Rights, have concluded in several cases that CIDT can arise in 
situations where women are denied access to, or are obstructed in, 
their attempts to obtain abortions or related health services that are 
legally available to them under domestic law. In these cases, human 
rights bodies have not recognized a substantive right to access 
abortion under international law, but have urged States to address a 
procedural deficit in their own laws that make women vulnerable to 
abuse while seeking an abortion.17 Second, the UN Human Rights 
Committee and the UN Committee Against Torture—two UN Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies18—have found that States have an international 
legal obligation to reform particularly restrictive abortion laws or risk 

16. See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of R.R. v. Poland and efforts to deny the 
applicant prenatal genetic testing, a prerequisite to obtaining a legal abortion in cases of fetal 
impairment in Poland. 
17. See infra Part II.A. 
18. The UN Human Rights Committee is a body of independent experts created by States 
parties’ agreement in the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 28. The U.N. Committee 
Against Torture is a body of independent experts created by States parties’ agreement in the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 17, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
CAT]. Both Committees monitor State compliance with their respective treaty, provide 
authoritative interpretations of their treaty, and, under optional protocols, are empowered to 
hear individual communications on alleged violations of the ICCPR and the CAT. See UNITED 
NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: INTRODUCTION, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited May 1, 2014); UNITED NATIONS, 
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/CATIntro.aspx 
(last visited May 1, 2014). 
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inflicting CIDT on women when these laws are applied, including in 
cases of rape or incest, when a woman’s life is at stake, or when the 
fetus is severely deformed.19  
While these human rights bodies have acknowledged the nexus 
between CIDT and the denial of abortion in different ways, I observe 
in Part III that they appear to rely on similar underlying 
considerations in finding that denying or obstructing a woman’s 
access to abortion amounts to CIDT. First, I argue that human rights 
bodies may engage in an implicit “justifiability” threshold test to 
determine whether the infliction of pain or suffering resulting from a 
State’s abortion regulations is proportionate to the achievement of a 
lawful State aim—and thus is a justifiable regulation that does not 
inflict CIDT. Second, human rights bodies have focused on the 
presence of “autonomy deficits”—such as youth, diminished mental 
capacity, or sexual violence—that compromise a woman’s ability to 
consent to the sex that leads to her pregnancy. In this view, a 
woman’s pain and suffering stems not only from being compelled to 
continue with a pregnancy that she does not want but also from the 
violation of her own bodily integrity. Additionally, human rights 
bodies give particular consideration to the presence of “maternal 
suffering,” or heightened pain stemming from the woman’s fear that 
her fetus will be born with an abnormality that will cause it suffering. 
Finally, I argue that human rights bodies would benefit from 
developing a stronger understanding of the autonomy interests that 
are implicated by a woman’s decision to have an abortion and the 
pain or suffering she may experience when that autonomy is 
frustrated. Further incorporating women’s autonomy interests into the 
CIDT analysis would be an important step forward in strengthening 
international legal protections for women’s reproductive rights.   
I. CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
In this Part, I outline the elements of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment under international human rights law as well as 
the ways in which state responsibility attaches for these violations. I 
focus on the understanding of CIDT under the treaty regimes 
discussed in Part II, namely the European Convention on Human 

19. See infra Part II.B. 
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Rights (“ECHR”),20 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”),21 and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).22  
A. Establishing the Level of Suffering Required for CIDT 
The CAT, ICCPR, and ECHR treaty regimes all recognize that 
CIDT involves acts that inflict severe physical or mental23 suffering 
on the victim. Determining whether the minimum level of suffering 
has been met is a fact-specific inquiry, and human rights bodies 
consider both objective and subjective factors in making this 
determination.24 Both the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Committee have noted that they consider all the 
circumstances of the case in their analysis, such as “the duration of 
the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the 
sex, age and state of health of the victim.”25 Additionally, the level of 
suffering required to constitute CIDT may change over time. The 
European Court has acknowledged that, under an “evolutive 
interpretation” of the European Convention on Human Rights, an act 
that at one time was deemed to be a form of inhuman or degrading 
treatment might in the future be classified as torture due to changes in 
the social context.26 This principle suggests that acts once considered 
not to meet the threshold of suffering for CIDT could come to be 

20. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter ECHR]. 
21. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 7. 
22. See CAT, supra note 18, arts. 1, 16. 
23. The Convention Against Torture explicitly acknowledges that mental suffering may 
amount to torture or CIDT. Id. art. 1. Furthermore, both the European Court and the Human 
Rights Committee have interpreted the ECHR and the ICCPR, respectively, to cover 
psychological torture and CIDT. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 
5310/71, ¶ 167 (1978); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, supra note 13, ¶ 
5. 
24. See Manfred Nowak, Torture and Enforced Disappearance, in INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 151, 155 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009).  
25. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5310/71, ¶ 162 (1978); see also Fehér 
v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 69095/10, ¶ 18 (2013); Vuolanne v. Finland, U.N. Human 
Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 265/1987, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) (1989). 
26. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GER. L.J. 1731 (2011) (describing the use of 
evolutive interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights); accord Selmouni v. France, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 25803/94, ¶ 101 (1999). Other human rights bodies have also used dynamic 
interpretive techniques. See Birgit Schlütter, Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by the 
UN Treaty Bodies, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 261, 282 
(Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012).  
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recognized as CIDT over time as societal understandings change.27 In 
short, there is no hard and fast test for determining when conduct rises 
to the level of CIDT; instead, human rights bodies will consider the 
treatment in light of the physical and mental impact on the victim and 
the social and political circumstances.  
Human rights bodies further distinguish between cruel/inhuman 
treatment and degrading treatment, based on whether the conduct 
severely humiliates the victim. The European Court of Human Rights 
has defined degrading treatment as conduct that humiliates and 
debases the victim, either in his own eyes or in the eyes of others.28 
Intent to humiliate the victim is not required under the European 
Court’s jurisprudence;29 conduct that inflicts a minimum level of 
humiliation and discloses a “callous disregard for [the victim’s] 
vulnerability and distress” can be enough to constitute degrading 
treatment.30 Further, under the Convention Against Torture, acts 
aimed at humiliating the victim constitute degrading treatment, 
regardless of whether severe pain is inflicted.31  
Finally, human rights bodies often define CIDT by 
distinguishing it from torture. In part, this distinction is based on the 
severity of the pain, suffering, or humiliation inflicted on the victim, 
with a higher threshold of suffering needed for an act to amount to 
torture. However, torture may also be distinguished by the presence of 
a particular mens rea that is not generally considered necessary for a 
finding of CIDT. The Convention Against Torture, for example, 
requires that torture be intentionally inflicted for one of several 
impermissible purposes,32 but does not require either intentional 

27. See CORNELIS WOLFRAM WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROTECTION FROM REFOULMENT 9 (2009), available at https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/
bitstream/handle/1887/13756/000-wouters-B-25-02-2009.pdf?sequence=2 (discussing 
evolutive interpretation of human rights treaties). 
28. See, e.g., Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 7511/76, ¶ 28 
(1982); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5856/72, ¶¶ 30, 32 (1978).  
29. See, e.g., Peers v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 28524/95, ¶¶ 74–75 (2001) (holding that 
the authorities’ failure to improve unacceptable prison conditions for a patient with a 
psychiatric condition demonstrated an objective “lack of respect for the applicant” and thus 
constituted degrading treatment, despite the fact that there was no “positive intention of 
humiliating or debasing the applicant”). 
30. R.R. v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶ 151 (2011); Campbell & Cosans v. 
United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 7511/76, ¶ 28 (1982). 
31. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of 
Torture, Manfred Nowak, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6 (Dec. 23, 2005). 
32. These impermissible purposes include but are not necessarily limited to: obtaining 
information or a confession; punishing a person for an act that the victim or a third person 
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infliction or the presence of an impermissible purpose for CIDT. 
Instead, the Committee Against Torture’s CIDT analysis focuses on 
the level of pain, suffering, or humiliation inflicted on the victim.33 
The European Court of Human Rights similarly defines torture as 
inhuman treatment that is both deliberate and “causing very serious 
and cruel suffering,”34 while noting that inhuman or degrading 
treatment is conduct that, while still serious, falls below that 
threshold.35 The Human Rights Committee, in contrast, does not 
focus on the intent or purpose of the perpetrator in distinguishing 
between torture and CIDT but instead engages in a holistic evaluation 
of the treatment in question.36  
In sum, across human rights regimes, CIDT analysis focuses on 
the level of suffering inflicted on the victim, measured in both 
subjective and objective terms. If a human rights body does not deem 
the conduct to be sufficiently severe, it will not be considered to have 
crossed the threshold into CIDT, even if pain or discomfort has been 
inflicted. The inquiry tends to be fact and context specific, and human 
rights bodies’ understanding of what conduct constitutes CIDT may 
evolve over time. 
B. Establishing State Responsibility for CIDT: Actions of State 
Officials and the Requirement of Due Diligence  
Even if conduct reaches the level of severity necessary to 
constitute CIDT, it may not amount to a violation of international law 
unless the conduct is attributable in some way to the State. States bear 
international responsibility for CIDT in two ways: through the direct 
acts or omissions of their officials or by failing to exercise due 

committed or is suspected of committing; intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person; 
for “any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” CAT, supra note 18, art. 1(1). 
33. See Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 10; Report of 
the Special Rapporteur, supra note 31, ¶ 35 (“Acts which fall short of [the definition of 
torture], particularly acts without the elements of intent or acts not carried out for the specific 
purposes outlined, may comprise CIDT under article 16 of the Convention.”).  
34. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5310/71, ¶ 167 (1978). 
35. See id.; INTERIGHTS, PROHIBITION OF TORTURE, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 14–
22 (2008), available at http://www.interights.org/files/105/Article%203%20Manual%
20Final%20March%202009.pdf. 
36. HRC, General Comment No. 20, supra note 13, ¶ 4 (noting that the distinction 
between torture and CIDT “depend[s] on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment 
applied”). 
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diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish acts of private 
persons that amount to CIDT.  
Generally, States are responsible under international law for the 
commission of torture or CIDT when the relevant acts are performed 
by or with the consent of public officials. The Convention Against 
Torture, for example, provides that a State may be held responsible 
for an act of torture if it is inflicted by a public official or by a private 
actor at the instigation or with the consent of a public official.37 The 
Committee Against Torture has further emphasized that States are 
responsible for those persons acting “on behalf of the State, in 
conjunction with the State, under its direction or control, or otherwise 
under colour of law.”38 The European Court of Human Rights has 
held that States are responsible for acts of torture or ill treatment 
committed by public officials, even if the official’s superiors claim 
not to have knowledge of the conduct.39 States are also responsible 
for ill treatment occurring within institutions exercising a public 
function, particularly those that exert some form of custody or control 
over individuals, such as prisons or detention facilities.40 State 
responsibility may even result when these facilities are run by private 
actors, if these institutions are responsible for carrying out a 
traditional public function.41  
States may also bear responsibility for acts of torture or CIDT 
committed by private actors if the State does not take adequate steps 
to prevent and provide redress for these acts. The European Court, 
Committee Against Torture, and Human Rights Committee all require 
States parties to enact and enforce adequate legal provisions to protect 
individuals from torture or CIDT.42 Criminalizing such acts, while 

37. CAT, supra note 18, art. 1(1). 
38. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 15. 
39. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5310/71, ¶ 159. However, a “State 
may avoid liability for Article 3 treatment where there appears to be individual acts of ill 
discipline in respect of which the State takes appropriate action. The State must take rigorous 
steps to discipline those responsible and adopt measures to ensure there is no repetition of such 
actions.” INTERIGHTS, supra note 35, at 48. 
40. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 15 
(recommending that States take action to prohibit, prevent, and redress torture or CIDT in 
prisons, hospitals, schools, military service, institutions that provide care to children, the 
elderly, the mentally ill, or the disabled, as well as institutions or contexts “where the failure of 
the State to intervene encourages and enhances the danger of privately inflicted harm”).  
41. See id. ¶ 17. 
42. See, e.g., A v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25599/94, ¶ 24 (1998) (holding that 
the English law “did not provide adequate protection to the applicant against treatment or 
punishment contrary to Article 3” and recommending that the State amend the law); CAT, 
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important, is not generally sufficient;43 States parties must instead 
work to ensure that legal provisions are actually effective, including 
by investigating and prosecuting alleged acts of torture or CIDT.44 In 
particular, States must intervene when officials “know or have 
reasonable grounds to believe” that private parties are engaging in 
torture or ill treatment,45 otherwise their failure to act may amount to 
encouragement or “de facto permission.”46 Overall, these provisions 
aim to ensure that the right not to be subjected to CIDT is realized in 
practice, not just on paper, and to ensure that victims receive adequate 
remedies whether the offending treatment is inflicted by a public or a 
private actor.47   
Human rights experts like the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
have also recognized that health care facilities can be sites of 
mistreatment that amounts to CIDT, and that women may be 
particularly vulnerable to abuse in the healthcare context.48 State 
responsibility for such mistreatment may attach directly if the health 
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supra note 18, art. 2 (requiring States parties to take “effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures” to prevent acts of torture and CIDT within their jurisdiction); 
Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 3 (extending the obligation 
under CAT Article 2 to CIDT); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, supra note 
13, ¶¶ 2, 8 (noting that legislative, administration, judicial, or “other measures” may be 
required to prevent and punish torture or CIDT). 
43. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, supra note 13, ¶ 8. 
44. See Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18. Aisling 
Reidy, The Prohibition of Torture: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOKS NO. 6, 40–43 (2002), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRHAND/DG2-EN-HRHAND-06(2003).pdf 
(discussing States’ positive obligation under Article 3 to investigate allegations of torture and 
ill-treatment). 
45. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18; see also Z & 
others v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 29392/95 ¶ 73 (2001) (holding that States must 
take measures that provide effective protection against ill-treatment of which “the authorities 
had or ought to have had knowledge”). 
46. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, supra note 2, ¶ 18. 
47. Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights arise from the 
principle that rights should be “practical and effective,” and from Article 13, which requires 
effective remedies for violations of the Convention. See A.R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5 
(2004). 
48. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: Torture and Ill-Treatment in Health Facilities, U.N. Doc 
A/22/53 (Feb. 1, 2013) (describing forms of torture of ill-treatment that have been documented 
in healthcare facilities); U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of 
Everyone to the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, U.N. Doc. 
A/66/254 (Aug. 3, 2011) (describing the rights violations that women suffer when reproductive 
healthcare is criminalized). 
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care facility is State-run, possibly even if the staff act of their own 
initiative rather than under a State policy that condones their 
conduct.49 In private health facilities, state responsibility for torture or 
CIDT may attach directly if the facility is seen as performing a 
traditional State function; otherwise, responsibility may still attach if 
the State has not taken adequate steps to prevent, investigate, 
prosecute, and punish ill treatment in these facilities, especially when 
the State has knowledge that this treatment is likely occurring. In 
practice, human rights bodies have relied on these standards to find 
States responsible for ill treatment inflicted by doctors and other 
actors in both public and private facilities when they deny or obstruct 
women’s access to abortion or related healthcare services in certain 
serious circumstances. Furthermore, they have recognized that States 
may be responsible for women’s suffering under domestic laws that 
sharply circumscribe access to abortion. These cases are the focus of 
Part II.   
II. DENIAL OF ABORTION AND RELATED PROCEDURES AS A 
FORM OF CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT 
The European Court of Human Rights, the Committee Against 
Torture, and the Human Rights Committee have all recognized that 
denying women access to abortion or obstructing their access to 
abortion-related services can in certain circumstances amount to 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under international law. In this 
Part, I identify two broad circumstances in which these human rights 
bodies have recognized that denial of abortion may amount to CIDT: 
first, when women are harassed, obstructed, and denied access to 
services when attempting to obtain an abortion that is legally 
permitted under the State’s domestic law and second, when restrictive 
abortion laws themselves compel women to continue with 
pregnancies that would have serious and often irrevocable 
consequences for the women’s physical or mental health. In the 
former situation, human rights bodies have held States responsible for 
not putting in place procedural mechanisms that would allow women 
to vindicate their rights under domestic law free of harassment. In the 
latter, human rights bodies have called on States to reform their 
substantive abortion laws and to provide sufficient exceptions for the 
life, health, or well-being of the woman. In the following Sections, I 
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49. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
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outline the development of these standards, first by the European 
Court of Human Rights and then by UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies.        
A. Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Within the “Margin of 
Appreciation”: The European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence 
on Abortion and CIDT 
In the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights (the 
“European Court” or the “Court”) has issued four decisions on access 
to abortion that have significantly developed its doctrine in this area. 
In each case, the applicants argued that their Article 3 right to be free 
from inhuman or degrading treatment had been violated because they 
had been denied access to or were seriously harassed in their efforts to 
obtain an abortion or prenatal genetic testing necessary to qualify for 
an abortion. The European Court found Article 3 violations in two 
cases where access to abortion or prerequisite health services was 
clearly legal in the applicants’ cases, while in the other two cases, 
where the applicants did not have a clear right to an abortion under 
domestic laws, the Court either found no violation of Article 3 or 
concluded that there were no grounds to address the issue.  
In this Section, I argue that the different outcomes in these cases 
are best explained by the fact that the Court considers abortion issues 
primarily under the right to private life enshrined in Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Article 8, as interpreted by 
the European Court, grants States what is known as a “margin of 
appreciation” for choosing how to regulate abortion, and the 
European Court has allowed States broad discretion under this 
doctrine to restrict access to abortion. In fact, the European Court has 
never held that the substance of a State’s abortion laws violates the 
European Convention, and instead has only found that procedural 
deficits in enforcing State abortion laws run afoul of Article 8. 
Consequently, I argue that the European Court’s Article 8 
jurisprudence implicitly circumscribes when and how the Court will 
address Article 3 issues in the abortion context. Thus, the relationship 
between Article 8 and Article 3 helps to explain why the European 
Court has only found that denial of abortion or related services 
amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in cases where women 
were denied services to which they were legally entitled.  
The European Court’s focus on procedure in these cases could 
be interpreted to suggest that the applicants’ pain and suffering arose 
primarily from the procedural deficits themselves—meaning, what the 
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Court cared about was the humiliation and anguish the women 
experienced in being obstructed from accessing a legal right. Such an 
interpretation, however, falters upon a careful reading of the Court’s 
opinions. As I argue below, these opinions demonstrate a concern 
with the suffering that women experience when their reproductive 
autonomy is denied and have substantive implications with respect to 
the development of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area. 
1. No Article 3 Violation: Tysiąc v. Poland and A, B, & C v. Ireland 
In 2007 and 2010, the European Court decided two cases that 
have formed the backbone of its abortion jurisprudence—Tysiąc v. 
Poland and A, B, & C v. Ireland. While the Court made seminal 
findings under Article 8—right to private life—in both cases, it failed 
to find an Article 3—right to be free from torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment—violation, despite recognizing that the 
applicants experienced pain and suffering when they were denied 
access to abortion.  
Tysiąc v. Poland concerned a Polish woman, Alicja Tysiąc, who 
was denied an abortion despite the fact that her doctors told her that 
continuing the pregnancy could lead to the loss of her eyesight due to 
a preexisting health condition. In Poland, abortion is legal if 
continuing the pregnancy endangers the woman’s life or health.50 
Although multiple doctors acknowledged that continuing the 
pregnancy posed a risk to Tysiąc’s eyesight, they refused to issue the 
certification for the abortion on the basis that the risk to her health 
was not certain.51 Tysiąc was unable to obtain an abortion. After 
giving birth, Tysiąc’s eyesight deteriorated rapidly and she was 
subsequently declared to be significantly disabled.52 In her application 
before the European Court, Tysiąc claimed that the Polish State had 
unduly interfered with her Article 8 right to private life by failing to 
provide her with a legal therapeutic abortion and by failing to provide 
a comprehensive legal framework to guarantee her rights.53 
Furthermore, Tysiąc claimed that the State’s failure to make a legal 

50. Tysiąc v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5410/03, ¶ 38 (2007) (citing Poland’s 1993 Law 
on Family Planning, Section 4a). Abortion is also legal when there is a high risk that the fetus 
will be “severely and irreversibly damaged or suffering from an incurable life-threatening 
disease” and if there are “strong grounds” to believe that the pregnancy is the result of a 
criminal act (e.g., rape). Id.  
51. See id. ¶ 9. 
52. See id. ¶ 18. 
53. See id. ¶ 67. 
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abortion possible in circumstances that threatened her health—
essentially forcing her to continue with a pregnancy knowing that her 
health could seriously deteriorate—resulted in “anguish and distress” 
amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3.54  
The European Court found a violation of Article 8 but not of 
Article 3. In examining the Article 8 claim, the Court declined to 
interpret the European Convention to guarantee access to any specific 
medical services as part of the right to private life.55 However, the 
Court found that once a State has chosen to make abortion legal in 
certain circumstances, it could not “structure its legal framework in a 
way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it.”56 Thus, the 
Court held that Article 8 required Poland to establish a procedural 
framework that would allow women to vindicate their right to a legal 
abortion while it was still possible for them to obtain one.57 As the 
Court noted, “[c]ompliance with requirements imposed by the rule 
of law presupposes that the rules of domestic law must provide a 
measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by 
public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the 
Convention.”58 Thus, while the Court did not find that Tysiąc had a 
right under Article 8 to obtain a legal abortion, it did find that Article 
8 required an effective procedure to determine her eligibility for an 
abortion under Polish law. 
With regard to Article 3, however, the European Court found 
that the “facts alleged did not disclose a breach,” despite Tysiąc’s 
argument that she had experienced “anguish and distress” knowing 
that continuing her pregnancy could lead to the loss of her eyesight.59 
The Court dismissed Tysiąc’s claim in a brief paragraph that simply 
referred to the Court’s “case-law on the notion of ill-treatment and the 
circumstances in which the responsibility of a Contracting State may 
be engaged . . . by reason of the failure to provide appropriate medical 
treatment.”60 The Court cited, without explanation, its decision in 
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54. Id. ¶ 65.  
55. See id. ¶¶ 107–08. 
56. Id. ¶ 116. 
57. See id. ¶ 121. The procedure must, at least, guarantee a pregnant woman the chance 
to be heard in person and to have her views considered; issue written grounds for its decisions; 
and act in a timely manner in order to “limit or prevent damage to a woman’s health which 
might be occasioned by a late abortion.” Id. ¶ 118. 
58. Id. ¶ 112. 
59. Id. ¶¶ 65–66. 
60. See id. ¶ 66. 
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ølhan v. Turkey, which concerned a Kurdish man who was severely 
beaten by Turkish security forces during the course of his arrest and 
who was then denied access to medical services for a significant 
period of time after the beatings.61 The ølhan case was, in many ways, 
a paradigmatic Article 3 violation. It involved physical injuries that 
were inflicted by State actors and subsequent failure by the State to 
provide the applicant with appropriate medical care while he was in 
custody. The reference to ølhan suggests that the suffering Tysiąc 
experienced was too far outside the traditional understanding of 
inhuman or degrading treatment to constitute a violation of Poland’s 
obligations under Article 3. 
The second case, A, B, & C v. Ireland (“ABC” or the “ABC 
case”),62 involved three Irish women who traveled to England to 
terminate their pregnancies due to Ireland’s restrictive abortions laws. 
Abortion is completely prohibited in Ireland except when there is a 
“real and substantial” risk to the life of the woman.63 At the time of 
the ABC case, however, it was unclear whether this limited exception 
had any practical effect since it had no statutory basis, and Irish law 
criminalized women who attempted or underwent an illegal 
abortion.64 Applicants A and B traveled to England to terminate their 
pregnancies due to physical and mental health concerns while C 
sought an abortion out of fear that continuing the pregnancy would 
threaten her life.65 All three claimed that their right to private life, 
including their physical integrity, had been unjustifiably interfered 
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61. See id. (discussing ølhan v. Turkey, No. 22494/93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004)). 
62. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
63. See Att'y Gen. v. X, [1992], 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.) (recognizing an exception to Ireland’s 
prohibition against abortion where there is a “real and substantial” risk to the life of the 
woman). Ireland reformed its abortion law in 2013, creating a statutory exception to Ireland’s 
prohibition on abortion in cases where the woman’s life is at risk. See Henry McDonald, 
Ireland Passes Law Allowing Limited Rights to Abortion, THE GUARDIAN (July 11, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/ireland-law-abortion-rights. Ireland’s 
prohibition against abortion stems from Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution, which reads: “The 
State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life 
of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend 
and vindicate that right.” IR. CONST., 1937, Art. 40.3.3. 
64. See Daniel Fenwick, The Modern Abortion Jurisprudence under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 12 MED. L. INT’L 249, 252, nn.12–13 (2013).  
65. A sought an abortion for reasons of “health and well-being.” She was a recovering 
alcoholic and she feared that her pregnancy would prevent her reunification with her existing 
children (at the time in social care) and delay her recovery. B, who was a teenager at the time 
of the abortion, initially sought the procedure because she was told that her pregnancy was 
likely ectopic and later, when this proved not to be the case, because she did not feel that she 
could support a child at that time. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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with by the Irish government’s restrictions on access to abortion.66 
Furthermore, they argued that they had experienced inhuman or 
degrading treatment in that Ireland’s criminalization of abortion 
stigmatized women who sought abortions and undermined their 
dignity, while the option of traveling abroad and seeking post-
abortion care in Ireland—which was legal, was “degrading and a 
deliberate affront to their dignity.”67 
The European Court ultimately held that only C’s rights had 
been violated; and, since abortion was technically legal to save a 
woman’s life in Ireland, the Court held, as in Tysiąc, that Article 8 
obligated Ireland to put in place a mechanism to allow C to vindicate 
her right to an abortion under Irish law. The Court, however, 
concluded that neither A’s nor B’s right to private life was violated 
since, under Article 8, Ireland could permissibly restrict access to 
abortion in cases involving physical or mental health concerns.68 With 
regard to Article 3, the Court declined to even consider the issue.69 
Although the Court acknowledged that it was “physically and 
psychologically arduous” for the applicants to travel to England for an 
abortion, it concluded that the fact that the women had to travel 
abroad for the procedure did not implicate Article 3.70 The Court did 
not provide further support for its conclusion. 
The European Court’s consideration of the Article 3 issue in 
Tysiąc and ABC suggested that a woman’s access to abortion was too 
far removed from traditional understandings of inhuman or degrading 
treatment to be a viable claim. However, shortly after its decision in 
ABC, the European Court handed down its decision in R.R. v. Poland, 
where it held that the State’s failure to provide the applicant with an 
adequate procedure for accessing prenatal genetic testing—a 
prerequisite for a legal abortion in Poland—not only amounted to a 
violation of the State’s obligations under Article 8, but also amounted 
to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3. This decision 
provided the first glimpse into when the Court would be willing to 
consider access to abortion as an Article 3 issue. 
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66. See id. ¶ 168; Fenwick, supra note 64, at 20. 
67. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 162. 
68. See infra notes 104–105 and accompanying text on the Court’s Article 8 analysis 
regarding A and B. 
69. The Court found that the Article 3 claim was “manifestly ill-founded” under Article 
35 §§ 3–4 of the European Convention and thus inadmissible. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 
25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 163–65. 
70. See id. ¶¶ 163–64. 
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2. Article 3 Violations: R.R. v. Poland and P & S v. Poland 
R.R. concerned a Polish woman (“R.R.”) who was repeatedly 
denied access to prenatal genetic testing, presumably because the 
doctors she consulted were concerned that she would obtain an 
abortion if the tests confirmed a suspected fetal abnormality. R.R. was 
eighteen weeks pregnant when her doctor performed an ultrasound 
and informed her that it was likely that her fetus was suffering from a 
malformation.71 The doctor recommended that R.R. undergo prenatal 
genetic testing in order to confirm or dispel his concern.72 Over the 
following eight weeks, R.R. visited sixteen doctors, underwent five 
sonograms, and was hospitalized twice.73 Still, she was unable to 
obtain a referral for the genetic testing. Eventually, R.R. entered a 
hospital without a referral, as an emergency patient, and received the 
testing.74 R.R. waited two weeks for the test results, which confirmed 
that her fetus had Turner syndrome, a rare genetic condition among 
females that leads to abnormal development.75 At that point, R.R. 
attempted to obtain an abortion under the exception in Polish law for 
fetal abnormalities. However, doctors refused, claiming that it was too 
late for a legal abortion since the fetus was, by then, viable outside the 
mother’s body.76 R.R. was forced to continue with the pregnancy and 
gave birth to a daughter with Turner syndrome. 
The Court held that Poland was responsible for the violation of 
R.R.’s rights under both Article 8 and Article 3 because it did not 
ensure R.R. access to a procedural framework to vindicate her legal 
right to prenatal genetic testing under Polish law. Drawing on its 
holding in Tysiąc, the Court concluded that, where domestic law 
allows for abortion in cases of fetal malformation, the State has a 
positive obligation under Article 8 to ensure that there is “an adequate 
legal and procedural framework to guarantee that relevant, full and 
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71. See R.R. v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶ 12 (2011). 
72. See id. 
73. See Litigation Briefing Series, R.R. v. Poland, P&S v. Poland, and Z v. Poland, 
CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, http://reproductiverights.org/en/rr-v-poland-st-v-poland-
z-v-poland (last visited May 1, 2014). 
74. See R.R. v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶¶ 27–28. 
75. See id. ¶ 33. R.R. also claimed that, prior to genetic testing, she had been informed 
that her fetus could have Edwards syndrome, which the Court described as “[a] rare genetic 
chromosomal syndrome . . . more severe than . . . Down syndrome. Causes mental retardation 
and numerous physical defects that often cause an early infant death.” Id. ¶ 16 n.2.  
76. See id. ¶ 33. 
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reliable information on the foetus’ health is available to pregnant 
women.”77  
The European Court, however, went farther than it had in Tysiąc, 
concluding that, in the process of being denied prenatal genetic 
testing, R.R. had experienced inhuman or degrading treatment under 
Article 3. In its analysis, the Court described the multiple and 
senseless delays that R.R. experienced in her attempts to access the 
testing.78 Furthermore, the Court noted that the State did not dispute 
that the testing was clearly necessary to confirm the initial diagnosis 
of fetal impairment, that the diagnostic services were available at all 
times, and that R.R. was legally entitled under Polish law to those 
services.79 The Court also emphasized that, as a pregnant woman, 
R.R. was in a position of great vulnerability and that, due to the 
obstruction of her doctors, she was forced for weeks to endure the 
anguish of not knowing the health of her fetus or how she and her 
family would care for a severely disabled child.80 Ultimately, the 
Court noted, R.R. received the results after it was too late to make a 
decision to undergo a lawful abortion.81 The Court also concluded 
that the treatment R.R. received at the hands of her doctors—who 
refused to provide her with accurate information or referrals for the 
genetic testing—was humiliating.82 Taking into account R.R.’s legal 
right to the testing, her humiliation by the doctors, and her mental 
anguish at not being able to make an informed choice about accessing 
a legal abortion, the Court found that Poland had violated its 
obligations under Article 3.  
In 2012, the Court followed R.R. with its decision in P & S v. 
Poland, where once again it found that Poland had failed to fulfill its 
obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. P & S involved a fourteen-year-old girl (“P”) who was 
raped by a classmate and subsequently became pregnant.83 In order to 
obtain an abortion, P received a certificate from the District 
Prosecutor confirming that the pregnancy was the result of unlawful 
sexual intercourse, one of the permitted reasons for abortion under 
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77. Id. ¶ 200. 
78. See id. ¶ 153. 
79. See id. ¶¶ 153–56, 160. 
80. See id. ¶ 159. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. ¶ 160. 
83. P & S v. Poland, No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 6, 8 (2012). 
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Polish law.84 P and her mother (“S”) approached the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and doctors at several hospitals, seeking a referral for 
an abortion.85 Their requests were repeatedly refused.86 In the 
following days, medical personnel undertook a range of measures to 
dissuade P from obtaining an abortion, including invoking 
conscientious objection without referring P to another provider, 
pressuring P to sign a statement that she did not want an abortion, and 
disclosing P’s personal and medical data to the press and the general 
public, leading to repeated harassment of P.87 Furthermore, after 
concerns were raised that S was pressuring P to have an abortion, P 
was temporarily removed from her parents’ custody against her will 
and put in a juvenile shelter.88 Ultimately, the Ministry of Health 
intervened and assisted P in obtaining an abortion in a hospital 500 
kilometers from her home.89 However, P claimed that the abortion 
was still carried out in a clandestine manner even though she had met 
the legal requirements for an abortion.90 P and S also discovered that 
their travel information had been leaked and that the Catholic 
Information Agency had posted it online that same day.91  
The European Court again held that the State had violated its 
obligations under both Articles 3 and 8. In its Article 8 analysis, the 
Court emphasized its holdings in Tysiąc and R.R., particularly that the 
State was obligated to put in place a “procedural framework enabling 
a pregnant woman to effectively exercise her right of access to lawful 
abortion.”92 Even though the State had ultimately assisted P in 
obtaining an abortion, the Court held that this was not sufficient to 
fulfill its positive obligations under Article 8, given the delays and 
other abuses P faced prior to receiving the procedure.93  
In concluding that P had suffered a violation of her rights under 
Article 3, the Court emphasized P’s particular vulnerability as both a 
minor and a rape victim.94 The Court observed that, despite her 
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84. See id. ¶ 10.  
85. See id. ¶¶ 11–15. 
86. See id.  
87. See id. ¶¶ 19, 26, 28, 32. 
88. See id. ¶¶  33, 34. 
89. See id. ¶ 40. 
90. See id. ¶ 41. 
91. See id.  
92. Id. ¶ 99. 
93. See id. 
94. Id. ¶ 162 (“In light of [her age and status as a rape victim], the Court has no choice 
but to conclude that the first applicant was in a situation of great vulnerability.”). 
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vulnerability, P had faced repeated pressure from medical personnel 
and others not to undergo an abortion.95 The Court further noted that 
P’s information had been released to the public without her or her 
parents’ consent and that she had faced serious harassment. 
Additionally, the Court highlighted the fact that the authorities had 
not only failed to provide P with protection in her vulnerable state, 
but had compounded the situation by arresting and placing her in 
juvenile detention against her will after she complained about 
harassment from anti-abortion activists.96 The Court also expressed 
dismay that the authorities had pursued a criminal investigation 
against P for unlawful sexual intercourse even though she “should 
have been considered to be a victim of sexual abuse.”97 Finally, the 
Court found that “[o]n the whole . . . no proper regard was had to 
[P’s] vulnerability and young age and her own views and feelings.”98 
Given the totality of the circumstances—including her difficulties 
obtaining a legal abortion and her detention—the Court held that the 
authorities had treated P in a “deplorable manner,” and that her 
suffering amounted to a violation of Article 3.99  
 The Court’s decisions in R.R. and P & S were notable 
developments in recognizing the pain and suffering women can 
experience when their attempts to access abortion or related health 
services are obstructed. In particular, the Court’s decisions 
highlighted the pain and suffering that arises when women face 
repeated harassment in attempting to obtain abortion services that are 
already legally available to them. In the following Section, I argue 
that the fact that the European Court has only found Article 3 
violations in such cases is in part an outgrowth of the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence under Article 8, which to date has served as an 
important guide and possible limit on the development of the Court’s 
Article 3 jurisprudence in this area. 
3. The Interaction Between Articles 3 and 8 in the European Court’s 
Abortion Jurisprudence 
Despite the importance of the European Court’s Article 3 
findings in R.R. and P & S, the Court’s abortion jurisprudence has 
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95. See id. ¶ 163. 
96. See id. ¶ 164. 
97. Id. ¶ 165. 
98. Id. ¶ 166 (emphasis added). 
99. Id. ¶¶ 168–69.  
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primarily developed under the Article 8 right to private life. The 
European Court has long recognized that the regulation of abortion 
implicates a woman’s right to private life while at the same time 
acknowledging that access to abortion may also touch on the State’s 
interest in the development of the fetus.100 Thus, the Court has given 
States a wide “margin of appreciation”101 under Article 8 to balance a 
woman’s interest in obtaining an abortion against other competing 
State values such as protecting fetal life.102 Both the now-defunct 
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court 
have consistently upheld State restrictions on access to abortion, 
finding that these restrictions were within the State’s margin of 
appreciation to regulate abortion and thus did not violate the right to 
private life.103   
The Court’s decision in A, B, & C v. Ireland illustrates its 
deferential approach to domestic abortion regulations and signals that 
the Court will be unwilling to strike down even extremely restrictive 
abortion laws as long as some measures are still technically available 
to women to safeguard their well-being. In reviewing Ireland’s 
abortion regulations, which prohibit abortion even in cases where the 
woman’s health or well-being is at stake, the Court concluded that 
they did not violate Article 8 because the value that Ireland was 
protecting—its asserted interest in fetal life—was legitimate and 
within the State’s margin of appreciation to balance against the 
woman’s interests.104 At the same time, the Court noted approvingly 
that Ireland’s law still allowed women to safeguard their health by 
traveling to England for an abortion and then seeking legal post-
abortion care back in Ireland, though it did not inquire into the 
difficulties Irish women may face in accessing these options.105 The 
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100. See Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 6959/75, 
3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 244, ¶¶ 61 (1976) (finding that Germany’s law restricting access to 
abortion law concerned the applicant’s private life but did not unduly interfere with the right 
since it allowed abortion in certain situations). 
101. See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 
31 NYU J. INT’L L & POL. 843 (1999). The term “margin of appreciation” does not appear in 
the text of the ECHR or in the travaux préparatoires but is a judge-made doctrine applied to 
certain Convention rights. Id. 
102. Vo v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 53924/00 ¶ 82 (2004) (leaving it up to States to 
decide the point at which life in pregnancy begins.)  
103. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010); Brüggemann, App 
No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 244. 
104. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 222, 237, 241. 
105. See id. ¶¶ 239, 241. 
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Court left open the question of whether a domestic law that blocked 
all access to abortion in cases where the mother’s life, health, or well-
being were at stake could stand under the margin of appreciation test, 
and thus did not foreclose substantive review of other abortion laws in 
the future. Yet the decision did showcase an unwillingness on the part 
of the Court to strike down even extremely restrictive abortion laws 
on substantive grounds.   
Instead, the European Court has focused on procedural deficits 
that prevent women from accessing services that are legally available 
under a State’s own domestic law and the way these deficits impinge 
on women’s Article 8 rights. In Tysiąc, ABC, R.R., and P & S, the 
Court failed to find that the applicants had any substantive right to 
access abortion or related health services but did hold that the 
respondent States had violated the applicants’ right to private life by 
failing to provide them with procedural mechanisms to vindicate 
rights granted to them under domestic law. Joanna Erdman has 
described this as the “procedural turn” in the European Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence, a move that has protected Article 8 interests 
against “interference on bad faith, for an improper purpose, or in light 
of irrelevant considerations,” but without explicitly defining what 
those interests actually are in the abortion context.106   
In each of the cases discussed above, Article 8 was the primary 
vehicle for finding a violation of the applicants’ human rights while 
the Article 3 holdings, at least in R.R. and P & S, served as an 
important, but subsidiary finding. Why then did the Court choose to 
make Article 3 holdings in R.R. and P & S if Article 8 primarily 
determined the outcomes? It is important to note that Tysiąc, R.R., 
and P & S all concerned the same set of Polish laws and policies and 
that R.R. and P & S highlighted Poland’s failure to effectively 
implement the Court’s decision in Tysiąc. The Article 3 holdings in 
both cases allowed the Court to powerfully reiterate to Poland the 
importance of following through on the requirements of the Tysiąc 
decision. This is not to suggest a purely political motivation on the 
part of the Court but a sensible incremental approach: In Tysiąc, the 
Court considered Article 8 to be sufficient to resolve the issue, which 
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106. Joanna N. Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court of 
Human Rights, in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 121, 137 (Rebecca J. 
Cook, Joanna N. Erdman & Bernard M. Dickens eds., 2014). 
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was presenting itself to the Court for the first time.107 When the issue 
of procedural fairness under Article 8 arose again in R.R. and P & S, 
the Court recognized that the Article 8 violation was sufficiently 
serious and entrenched to warrant examining the related Article 3 
issue more closely.  
These cases may also be distinguished in that R.R. and P both 
sought medical services that were clearly legal in their circumstances 
while the applicants in ABC and Tysiąc sought services under 
conditions that made the procedure questionably legal, at best. Thus, 
the European Court’s opinions in R.R. and P & S could be seen as 
recognizing that women who are obstructed in their efforts to obtain 
legal and available medical services suffer a particularly acute form of 
pain that is more likely to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
The obstructive acts of health care providers, the State, and other 
actors could be seen as particularly harmful and degrading precisely 
because the women were only seeking what the State had already 
guaranteed to them by law.  
At the same time, it would be too simplistic to conclude that 
R.R. and P’s pain and suffering stemmed only or even primarily from 
the fact that the services they sought were legally available. Instead, 
the European Court’s opinions put forward a broader understanding 
of the women’s pain and suffering––one stemming from the 
frustration of their ability to make important decisions about their 
bodies and their futures.108 In R.R., for example, the Court 
emphasized the suffering that R.R. experienced when she was not 
given the information needed to make crucial choices about the future 
of her pregnancy and the well-being of her family, while in P & S, the 
Court highlighted that P’s suffering was exacerbated by the fact that 
her “own views and feelings” were not taken into account in her 
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107. Joanna Erdman has argued that the “procedural turn” in the European Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence under Article 8 may have emerged as a way to “reengage rather than 
alienate the state” in ensuring that rights under the European Convention on Human Rights are 
upheld. Id. at 133 (“By turning to positive obligations and to procedural rights—by enlisting 
the state and its laws in making rights effective—the European Court works through rather 
than against the national legal order.”). Thus, it is plausible that in Tysiąc, an early effort by 
the Court to engage the Polish State in the protection of Article 8 procedural rights in the 
abortion context, the European Court felt that it was not necessary to go further to find a 
violation of Article 3 in order to enlist the cooperation of the State in this regard. 
108. In both R.R. and P & S, the applicants were clearly entitled to the medical services 
they sought; thus, the European Court was able to explore the substantive impact that the 
denial of these services had on the applicants without having to make any conclusions with 
respect to the substantive obligations enshrined in Article 8 itself. 
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attempts to obtain an abortion. The Court’s reasoning in both cases 
suggests a substantive concern with the State’s frustration of a 
woman’s reproductive autonomy, which moves beyond the 
procedural focus of its Article 8 analysis.109  
The substantive component of the European Court’s Article 3 
reasoning suggests that the Court could eventually find that a State’s 
legal restrictions on abortion resulted in the infliction of inhuman or 
degrading treatment on a woman seeking access to prohibited 
services. Again, however, the Court will likely only find that the 
implementation of a State’s substantive abortion law has violated 
Article 3 if it also concludes that the law has exceeded the margin of 
appreciation under Article 8. In short, an expansion of the Court’s 
Article 3 jurisprudence in this area is likely contingent on a shift in its 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine to evaluating State 
abortion laws.     
B. Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic Law: The Human Rights 
Committee and the Committee Against Torture 
Like the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights 
Committee has recognized that a woman can experience CIDT when 
she is faced with harassment that obstructs her access to a legally 
available abortion and when she lacks access to an effective 
mechanism to vindicate her rights. Additionally, the Human Rights 
Committee and the Committee Against Torture have also urged States 
to consider revising their restrictive abortion laws or risk inflicting 
CIDT on women seeking abortions in cases of rape or serious threat 
to a woman’s life or well-being.  
1. The UN Human Rights Committee: K.L. v. Peru and L.M.R. v. 
Argentina 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the UN Human Rights Committee, 
through its General Comments and Concluding Observations to 
States, expressed its concern that States’ restrictive abortion laws 
could run afoul of their obligations to prevent torture or CIDT under 
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109. This is not to say that the Court’s Article 8 analysis is wholly devoid of concern for 
women’s substantive autonomy interests. Erdman argues that the Tysiąc opinion did introduce 
one substantive norm under Article 8, namely, the right to be heard within procedural 
mechanisms governing access to legal abortion. As Erdman noted, “Within a right to be heard 
sits a respect for personal autonomy and development, substantive interests associated with the 
most liberal of abortion regimes.” Id. at 140.  
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Article 7 of the ICCPR, particularly when the pregnancy was the 
result of rape or the woman’s life was threatened.110 The Committee 
has also used its Concluding Observations to urge States to reform 
restrictive abortion laws to ensure their compliance with Article 7. 
For example, in its Concluding Observations to Peru in 2013, the 
Committee observed that Peru’s criminalization of abortion was 
incompatible with its obligations under Article 7 and recommended 
that Peru revise its laws to allow abortion in cases of rape or incest.111 
Furthermore, in its most recent Concluding Observations to Ireland, 
the Committee, citing to Article 7, expressed its concern that Ireland 
continued to prohibit abortion in most circumstances and highlighted 
the “severe mental suffering caused by the denial of abortion services 
to women seeking abortions due to rape, incest, fatal foetal 
abnormality or serious risks to health.”112 The Committee concluded 
by recommending that Ireland undertake significant reforms, namely 
that it “[r]evise its legislation on abortion, including its Constitution, 
to provide for additional exceptions in cases of rape, incest, serious 
risks to the health of the mother, or fatal foetal abnormality”113 to 
comply with its obligations under the ICCPR.114 
The Human Rights Committee has further elaborated on its 
understanding of the nexus between restrictive abortion laws and 
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110. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28, supra note 3, ¶ 11 
(noting that in assessing a State’s compliance with Article 7 of the ICCPR, the Committee 
would examine whether States provided access to safe abortion for women who became 
pregnant as a result of rape); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations to Peru, ¶ 20, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/PER (2000) (observing that the criminalization of abortion is 
incompatible with Article 7 of the ICCPR and recommending that Peru revise its abortion 
law). 
111. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations to Peru, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/PER/CO/5 (2013). 
112. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations to Ireland, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4 (2014).   
113. Id. ¶ 9(a) (emphasis added). 
114. As of this writing, two petitions are pending before the UN Human Rights 
Committee on behalf of Irish women who traveled to the United Kingdom to obtain abortion 
services after discovering that they were carrying fetuses with fatal anomalies. The petitioners 
claim that Ireland’s abortion laws, which make it illegal for women to obtain abortions in cases 
of fetal abnormality, violate their right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
under Article 7 of the ICCPR, among other claims. See Press Release, Center for Reproductive 
Rights Brings Second Case Against Ireland Abortion Laws to United Nations, CENTER FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (Mar. 13, 2014), available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-
room/CRR-brings-second-Ireland-case; Press Release, Irish Woman Forced to Travel Abroad 
for Abortion Brings Case to United Nations, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (Nov. 13, 
2013), available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/irish-woman-forced-to-travel-
abroad-for-abortion-brings-case-to-united-nations.   
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CIDT in two individual communications where it found that denying 
or obstructing a woman’s access to an abortion amounted to CIDT: 
K.L. v. Peru and L.M.R. v. Argentina. 
In K.L. v. Peru, the author of the communication was a 17-year-
old girl who was diagnosed as pregnant with an anencephalic fetus, a 
rare condition in which the fetus develops without a significant part of 
its brain, skull, or scalp. The doctors told K.L. that the fetus would not 
survive long after delivery and that she faced risks to her life if she 
continued with the pregnancy.115 They advised K.L. to terminate the 
pregnancy. However, the hospital director refused to provide K.L. 
with the abortion on the grounds that the Peruvian Penal Code 
criminalized abortion in cases where the fetus was likely to be born 
with a severe deformity and only permitted the procedure when 
abortion was the only way to save the life of the pregnant woman or 
to avoid “serious or permanent damage to her health.”116 The Ministry 
of Health medical personnel also refused K.L.’s request for an 
abortion authorization. K.L. subsequently gave birth to a daughter and 
nursed her for four days until the baby died.117  
The Human Rights Committee found that Peru had violated its 
obligations under Article 7 by not allowing K.L. to obtain an abortion. 
The Committee noted that K.L. had endured pain and distress from 
being forced to carry her pregnancy to term and then witnessing her 
daughter’s deformities, all while knowing the child would die shortly 
after birth.118 The Committee also accepted K.L.’s assertion that she 
had fallen into a deep depression after her delivery as well as a report 
from a psychiatrist and member of the Peruvian Medical Association 
averring that denying K.L. an abortion had “substantially contributed 
to triggering the symptoms of depression” and had severely impacted 
K.L.’s mental health.119 The Committee further noted that K.L. was 
particularly vulnerable to this suffering since she was a minor.120 
Given the early diagnosis of the fetus’s condition, the Committee 
concluded that K.L.’s mental suffering was foreseeable and that the 
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115. Human Rights Comm., Commc'n., K.L. v. Peru, supra note 9, ¶ 2.2. 
116. See id. ¶ 2.3. 
117. See id. ¶ 2.6. 
118. See id. ¶ 6.3. 
119. Id. ¶ 2.5. 
120. See id. ¶ 6.3. (finding that Peru had violated Articles 2, 17, and 24 of the ICCPR.); 
id. ¶ 8 (ordering the State to provide compensation to K.L. and to “take steps to ensure that 
similar violations do not occur in the future.”). 
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State’s refusal to allow the abortion was the cause of K.L.’s 
suffering.121  
The K.L. decision—the first international decision to find that 
denial of abortion amounted to CIDT122—was particularly notable for 
recognizing the severity of the mental suffering K.L. experienced as 
the result of carrying a seriously deformed fetus to term and for 
placing this suffering at the center of its analysis. Furthermore, the 
Human Rights Committee’s Article 7 finding rested on Peru’s failure 
to provide K.L. with a therapeutic abortion, without any reference to 
the lawfulness of the procedure. In contrast, the Committee accepted 
and relied explicitly on K.L.’s claim that she qualified for a legal 
abortion in Peru when finding a violation of Article 17—right to 
private life.123 The contrast between the Committee’s reasoning under 
Article 7 and Article 17 suggests that the Committee understood 
K.L.’s suffering as arising from being compelled to continue with her 
pregnancy, not from being denied a right recognized under domestic 
law. Furthermore, the Committee’s focus on the harm to K.L.’s 
mental health implied that Peru was required to either amend its 
abortion law or interpret its health exception broadly to include 
threats to mental health in order to avoid future inflictions of CIDT on 
young women in positions similar to K.L.124 
The Human Rights Committee built on K.L. v. Peru when it 
decided L.M.R. v. Argentina in 2011. L.M.R. was a young, mentally 
disabled girl who became pregnant as a result of rape. Although 
Argentine law allows for mentally disabled women who are rape 
victims to access abortion,125 L.M.R. faced multiple hurdles to 
obtaining an abortion: the first hospital she and her family approached 
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121. See id. ¶ 6.3. 
122. See Luisa Cabal & Jaime M. Todd-Gher, Reframing the Right to Health: Legal 
Advocacy to Advance Women’s Reproductive Rights, in REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
120, 128 (Andrew Clapham & Mary Robinson eds., 2012). 
123. See Pardiss Kebriaei, UN Human Rights Committee Decision in KL v. Peru, 15 
INTERIGHTS BULL. 101, 151–52 (2006), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Interights_KL_v_Peru.pdf. This suggests that the 
Committee’s omission of this detail in its Article 7 analysis was deliberate rather than 
inadvertent. See Human Rights Comm., Commc'n., K.L. v. Peru, supra note 9, ¶ 6.4. 
124. See Kebriaei, supra note 123. 
125. Código Penal [Cód. Pen.] [Criminal Code] art. 86(2) (Abeledo Perrot, Buenos 
Aires, 1971) (Arg.); Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 1608/2007, L.M.R. v. Argentina, ¶ 
2.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (2011).  
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refused to perform the abortion, even though it was legal;126 the 
matter was brought before a juvenile court judge who issued an 
injunction to prevent the hospital from performing the abortion, 
despite the fact that Argentine law does not provide for judicial 
intervention in determining whether an abortion is legally 
available;127 and even though the judge’s order was eventually 
overruled by a higher court,128 multiple hospitals and health centers 
still refused to provide the abortion.129 L.M.R. and her family also 
faced public pressure not to undergo the abortion, including pressure 
from the Catholic University, the Corporation of Catholic Lawyers, 
and from the public who sent threatening letters to the hospital where 
L.M.R. was seeking medical care.130 Ultimately, L.M.R. obtained a 
clandestine abortion, even though the Supreme Court of Justice of 
Buenos Aires had ruled that her termination could proceed legally.131  
The Human Rights Committee found multiple violations of 
L.M.R.’s rights under the ICCPR, including her right to be free from 
CIDT under Article 7. The Committee focused on the State’s 
procedural omission, noting that it was this omission “in failing to 
guarantee L.M.R.’s right to a termination of pregnancy [as provided 
under domestic law] . . . [that] caused L.M.R. physical and mental 
suffering” amounting to a violation of Article 7.132 Like the European 
Court in R.R. and P & S, the Human Rights Committee recognized 
that L.M.R. had experienced particularly severe humiliation and pain 
from being repeatedly denied access to a legal procedure. The fact 
that L.M.R. ultimately had to obtain a clandestine procedure—which 
is often less safe than a legal procedure133—may also have 
contributed to the finding. The Committee further recognized that 
L.M.R.’s vulnerability as a young rape victim with a diminished 
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126. See Human Rights Comm., Commc'n., K.L. v. Peru, L.M.R. v. Argentina, ¶ 2.2, 
supra note 114. 
127. See id. ¶ 2.4. 
128. See id. ¶ 2.6. 
129. See id. ¶¶ 2.7–2.8. 
130. See id. ¶¶ 2.7, 2.9. 
131. See id. ¶ 2.8. 
132. Id. ¶ 9.2. 
133. According to the World Health Organization, 47,000 women die from 
complications of unsafe abortion each year while deaths due to unsafe abortion make up close 
to 13% of all maternal deaths. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNSAFE ABORTION: GLOBAL AND 
REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE INCIDENCE OF UNSAFE ABORTION AND ASSOCIATED 
MORTALITY IN 2008 1 (6th ed. 2011), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/
9789241501118_eng.pdf?ua=1. 
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mental capacity contributed to L.M.R.’s pain and suffering.134 
Finally, the Committee recognized that L.M.R. did not have access to 
an effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR with respect to 
Article 7—CIDT, among other rights; although L.M.R. was 
eventually able to obtain an abortion, “to achieve this result, [she] had 
to appear before three separate courts, during which period the 
pregnancy was prolonged by several weeks, with attendant 
consequences for L.M.R.’s health that ultimately led [her] to resort to 
illegal abortion.”135 The Committee concluded by calling on 
Argentina to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future.136 
2. The Committee Against Torture: Concluding Observations on 
Access to Abortion 
While the Committee Against Torture has not heard an 
individual communication on access to abortion under the Convention 
Against Torture, it has noted in its Concluding Observations to States 
that restrictive abortion laws may lead to suffering tantamount to 
CIDT and has urged States to reform their abortion laws as part of 
their obligation to prevent CIDT. In its Concluding Observations to 
Nicaragua, for example, the Committee noted with concern that 
Nicaragua completely prohibits abortion, even in cases of rape, incest, 
or a life-threatening pregnancy.137 The Committee noted that when a 
woman’s pregnancy is the result of gender-based violence, denying 
the woman access to abortion could cause her to constantly relive the 
violation against her and would “cause[ ] serious traumatic stress and 
a risk of long-lasting psychological problems such as anxiety and 
depression.”138 It further acknowledged that, since Nicaragua’s 
abortion ban had been implemented, several women had died from 
“lack of timely medical intervention to save [their lives], in clear 
violation of numerous ethical standards of the medical profession.”139 

134. L.M.R., supra note 125, ¶ 9.2. 
135. Id. ¶ 9.4.  
136. Id. ¶ 11. 
137. See Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee Against 
Torture: Nicaragua, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/NIC/CO/1 (2009); see also AMNESTY INT’L, THE 
TOTAL ABORTION BAN IN NICARAGUA: WOMEN’S LIVES ENDANGERED, MEDICAL 
PROFESSIONALS CRIMINALIZED 7–9 (July 2009), available at www.amnestyusa.org/sites/
default/files/pdfs/nicaragua_abortion_ban_report__english.pdf (discussing the legal 
framework around abortion in Nicaragua). 
138. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations to Nicaragua, supra note 137, ¶ 
16. 
139. Id.  
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The Committee urged Nicaragua to reform its abortion law, at least to 
provide exceptions in cases where pregnancy was the result of rape or 
incest.140 Similarly, in its Concluding Observations to El Salvador, 
the Committee noted, that the State’s criminal abortion ban had 
resulted in “serious harm to women, including death”141 and urged the 
State to take all legal and other measures necessary to prevent, 
investigate, and punish “all acts” that endanger the health of women 
and girls, including “by providing the required medical treatment.”142 
In sum, the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights 
Committee, and the Committee Against Torture all recognize that 
denying or obstructing a woman’s access to an abortion—in many 
cases, compelling her to continue with a pregnancy against her will—
amounts to CIDT in certain contexts. These bodies have looked to a 
number of factors in determining whether women have experienced 
CIDT, including whether access to abortion is extra-legally obstructed 
and the manner in which it is obstructed; whether the woman is 
particularly vulnerable to abuse—for example, if she is a minor or a 
rape victim; and whether the woman has experienced serious physical 
or mental health consequences from continuing with the pregnancy. 
In the following Part, I examine these cases and standards further to 
distill some common guiding principles that appear to be at work in 
human rights bodies’ consideration of when denial of abortion 
amounts to CIDT.  
III. UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES’ APPROACHES 
TO IDENTIFYING CIDT IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT 
As described above, human rights bodies have found that both 
substantive legal provisions that restrict access to abortion as well as 
procedural deficits that obstruct women from accessing legal 
reproductive health services can lead to the infliction of pain or 
suffering amounting to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. But 
while human rights bodies have cited numerous factors to support 
these findings, they have not put forward a clear conceptualization of 
when the physical or psychological pain experienced by women in 
this context crosses the threshold to become CIDT. This issue is 
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140. See id. 
141. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee Against 
Torture: El Salvador, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SLV/CO/2 (2009). 
142. Id. 
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common to the CIDT analysis more generally, which consists 
primarily of fact-specific, case-by-case inquiries rather than an 
application of bright line rules. At the same time, human rights bodies 
have not generally found that denials of other forms of healthcare 
amount to CIDT, even when they result in severe pain or suffering, 
instead analyzing these issues under other human rights such as the 
right to health. Thus, it is important to understand why abortion, in 
certain circumstances, is different and what implications this holds for 
the protection of women’s human rights in the healthcare context. 
A. Human Rights Bodies Appear to Consider the Justifiability or 
Proportionality of the State Regulation Restricting Access to Abortion 
in Determining Whether the Regulation Inflicts CIDT on a Woman 
Denied an Abortion 
As discussed in Part I, human rights bodies’ CIDT analysis 
focuses primarily on whether the conduct in question meets a 
minimum severity threshold. It is not always clear, however, how this 
threshold is determined. Some commentators have suggested that the 
minimum severity threshold is actually determined, at least in part, by 
an examination of whether the infliction of pain or suffering is 
justifiable in light of lawful State purposes. If it is justifiable, then it 
cannot amount to CIDT, despite the infliction of serious pain or 
suffering;143 conversely, if the treatment is not justifiable, then it is 
more likely to constitute CIDT. 
The former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, 
is a proponent of using a justifiability test to determine whether 
conduct meets the threshold for CIDT. Nowak has argued that the 
infliction of pain or suffering may be justifiable, and thus not an act of 
CIDT, if the action is legal under domestic law, aimed at a lawful 
purpose, and not excessive but necessary in the particular 
circumstances to achieve any of the State’s lawful purposes.144 
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143. See Frederick Piggott, Justification Doctrine in the Prohibition on Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 18 TORTURE 116, 119 (2008). The European Commission 
on Human Rights suggested that CIDT is in part defined as treatment that is unjustifiable in a 
particular situation. See Greek Case, 12 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R., ¶ 186 (Eur. Comm'n on 
H.R.) (1969). 
144. See Manfred Nowak & Elizabeth McArthur, The Distinction Between Torture and 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 16 TORTURE 147, 149 (2006). While Nowak applies 
this test to the use of police force outside of State custody, he does not limit it to such contexts 
but instead proposes it as a general threshold test for determining when conduct amounts to 
CIDT.  See id. 
2015] (EN)GENDERING SUFFERING 133 
Nowak argues that the infliction of severe pain or suffering deserves 
particularly strong moral condemnation in contexts of custody or 
control where the victim is powerless to resist her imprisoner. Thus, 
in those circumstances, the infliction of severe pain or suffering by 
the State can never be proportional and always amounts at least to 
CIDT, if not torture.145 However, outside of custody, the victim’s 
powerlessness is reduced and thus the decision of the State to use or 
condone force poses less of a threat to the individual, who now has 
the power to resist.146 Given the increased autonomy of the individual 
outside of custody, the State has greater latitude to use lawful but 
coercive measures against its citizens, within the bounds of the 
proportionality analysis. Nowak does, however, qualify his test by 
noting that situations of powerlessness may also arise outside of 
custody and in such circumstances the proportionality threshold 
should not apply to the CIDT determination.147  
While human rights bodies do not generally cite Nowak’s 
justifiability/proportionality test as part of their CIDT analysis, an 
implicit use of this test may help explain why these bodies have found 
the denial of abortion to amount to CIDT in some cases, but not in 
others. In ABC, for example, the European Court determined that A 
and B were denied abortions pursuant to domestic law and that 
Ireland’s regulation of abortion was an appropriate and lawful State 
function under Article 8 of the European Convention.148  
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the restrictions were 
burdensome but not excessive since the women were still able to 
travel to England to obtain abortions and could seek post-abortion 
care at home in Ireland. Therefore, the European Court appears to 
have interpreted Ireland’s abortion law to be proportionate and 
justifiable, and thus chose not to engage the question of inhuman or 
degrading treatment at all. 
In K.L. v. Peru, on the other hand, the Human Rights Committee 
may have found that the application of Peru’s restrictive abortion law 
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145. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak, ¶¶ 37–38, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 (Feb. 5, 2010). 
146. See id. 
147. See id. ¶ 188. 
148. See A, B, & C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). But it was not clear 
that C was denied an abortion pursuant to domestic law since it was possible that she was 
legally entitled to an abortion to preserve her life. Thus, the justifiability theory is not fully 
explanatory in this case. See id. 
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to K.L. exceeded what was necessary to achieve a lawful State 
purpose. Presumably, States enact restrictions on abortion in order to 
protect what they believe to be the life of the fetus or to show respect 
for “life” generally. However, in cases of severe fetal impairment, 
where there is little to no chance that the child will survive long after 
birth, denying a woman access to an abortion does not seem to 
advance either of these State interests. In light of the severe mental 
anguish that K.L. experienced in carrying her pregnancy to term, 
forcing her to do so seemed extremely disproportionate to the 
minimal State interest at stake and thus crossed the threshold into 
CIDT.  
The use of a justifiability threshold may provide human rights 
bodies with greater guidance for understanding when the denial of an 
abortion is sufficiently serious to constitute CIDT. The strongest cases 
will be those like R.R., P & S, and L.M.R., where public or private 
actors unlawfully harass or obstruct a woman’s access to a lawful 
abortion or related procedure. Even if certain individuals act lawfully 
in declining to provide abortion services or referrals—for example, 
under a conscientious objection law, the State’s failure to guarantee 
domestically recognized rights is an omission that cannot be seen as 
aimed at a lawful purpose and thus violates the second prong of the 
justifiability test. Assessment of the third prong—basically, 
determining when regulation is excessive to the lawful aim—is less 
apparent and returns to difficult but necessary questions about how to 
assess the level of pain or suffering that women experience when 
denied access to an abortion. To some extent, a categorical approach 
may be useful: for example, adopting the view that denying access to 
abortion to a rape victim or a woman whose life is at stake is always 
excessive to lawful State aims. However, while human rights bodies 
have also found that lesser—but still severe—forms of physical and 
mental suffering can amount to CIDT in the abortion context, the 
justifiability test provides little guidance for determining why State 
regulation is excessive in those contexts and to what extent this 
doctrine may restrict States’ authority to regulate access to abortion. 
The following Sections describe some factors human rights bodies 
already consider or should take into account in making that 
determination. 
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B. Human Rights Bodies Consider Certain Autonomy Deficits in their 
CIDT Analysis but Should Examine Autonomy-Based Harms More 
Broadly 
Human rights bodies may be more likely to find that the denial 
of an abortion or related services is excessive to lawful State aims, 
and amounts to CIDT, when the pregnancy is the result of a situation 
that compromises the woman’s ability to consent to sexual 
intercourse. In such cases, the pain or suffering of a woman who is 
denied an abortion is perceived as heightened by this “autonomy 
deficit.” Human rights bodies have noted the particular vulnerability 
of women who are minors, rape victims, or mentally disabled, all 
conditions that diminish or eliminate their ability to consent to sex, 
and thus the possibility of pregnancy. With regard to minors like 
K.L., denying access to a desired abortion may force them to live with 
the consequences of an act that they did not fully consent to, inflicting 
severe pain or suffering.149 The autonomy deficit with regard to rape 
victims may be even starker: women who become pregnant as a result 
of rape do not make an autonomous choice to engage in the sex act 
that results in pregnancy. Furthermore, human rights bodies 
increasingly classify rape as torture,150 suggesting that the pregnancy 
itself is the result of a torturous act and that continuing the pregnancy 
can compound a woman’s pain and suffering by forcing her to relive 
the violence against her.151 Given that such pregnancies may be seen 
as the consequence of an act of torture or CIDT—and thus an ongoing 
manifestation of those acts152—it is not surprising that the UN Treaty 
Monitoring Bodies have urged States to reform their laws to allow for 
abortion in cases of rape and the European Court of Human Rights 
has stressed that, when abortion is lawful for rape victims, the 
procedure must be accessible.  
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149. But while a person’s status as minor seems to be important for the CIDT analysis, 
no human rights body has found that a State must provide a minor with an abortion in any 
circumstances simply because she is a minor. 
150. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
152. In L.M.R. v. Argentina, for example, the applicants framed L.M.R.’s access to 
abortion as a way to mitigate the harm caused by the sexual abuse that led to her pregnancy. 
See Lisa M. Kelly, Reckoning with Narratives of Innocent Suffering in Transnational Abortion 
Litigation, in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 303, 317–18 (Rebecca J. 
Cook, Joanna N. Erdman & Bernard M. Dickens eds., 2014) (citing L.M.R., supra note 125, ¶ 
3.1).  
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The recognition that it can be cruel to force a woman to continue 
with a pregnancy resulting from an autonomy deficit is a significant 
development in human rights law. At the same time, as Lisa Kelly has 
pointed out, it risks singling out a small category of women as 
“deserving” access to abortion due to their own “innocent” role in the 
sex act while branding women who choose to have sex as 
undeserving of the same access.153 In other words, women who 
become pregnant but did not consent to sex may be seen as suffering 
due to the shattering of their sexual innocence, not because their 
autonomy over their bodies and reproductive futures has been 
frustrated or denied. As Kelly points out, the view of who deserves 
access to an abortion “risks reinforcing a particular form of sexual 
discipline through law”: namely, in the words of Drucilla Cornell, that 
“[w]omen who suffered incest and rape did not choose to have sex, 
and therefore should not be punished with an unwanted pregnancy; 
those who chose to have sex should expect such a punishment.”154  
Denying a woman access to an abortion or related health 
services also implicates a broad range of autonomy interests, 
regardless of whether the woman is a minor, a rape victim, or 
mentally incapacitated, which should receive greater consideration in 
human rights bodies’ CIDT analysis. Pregnancy poses very real and 
particular risks to a woman’s life and health, stemming from the fact 
that a woman carries the fetus within her own body. By denying a 
woman the opportunity to make decisions about continuing a 
pregnancy, particularly when her health is threatened, a State can 
impose serious physical consequences on her. This may also result in 
severe mental suffering when a woman anticipates a physical harm 
from continuing a pregnancy but is prevented from taking medical 
steps to address that possibility. Human rights bodies could improve 
their CIDT analysis by recognizing that the deprivation of 
autonomous choice, coupled with the possibility of serious health 
effects from continuing the pregnancy,155 could in turn lead to mental 
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153. Kelly, Narratives of Innocent Suffering, supra note 152, at 317. 
154. Id. (citing DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION, 
PORNOGRAPHY, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 81 (1995)).  
155. Although this paragraph focuses on potential harm to a woman’s physical health in 
cases like Tysiąc, our conception of good health should not be confined to the “absence of 
disease or infirmity” but should be understood as a “state of complete physical, mental and 
social well-being.” See Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as 
adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946, signed on July 
22, 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health 
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pain or suffering on the same level as that experienced by women like 
R.R. or K.L. In Tysiąc, for example, the European Court may have 
found a violation of Article 3 if it had fully considered and recognized 
the mental suffering that Tysiąc experienced fearing that she could 
lose her eyesight if she continued with her pregnancy.  
Furthermore, denying a woman autonomy over her body and her 
reproduction can have other social consequences that inflict severe 
pain and suffering on her. Human rights bodies have already 
recognized this type of autonomy-based harm in the reproductive 
rights context, in particular with respect to coercive sterilization. In 
V.C. v. Slovakia and N.B. v. Slovakia, the European Court of Human 
Rights found that sterilizing a woman without her informed consent 
amounted to degrading treatment in large part because it interfered 
with her autonomy in her reproductive choices.156 The Court noted 
that coercive sterilization “was liable to arouse in [the women] 
feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority and to entail lasting 
suffering,”157 and that the doctors’ interference with the applicants’ 
ability to have children deprived them of an important life choice, 
leading to depression, the deterioration of their personal relationships, 
and the loss of status in their communities.158  
The abortion context raises similar autonomy interests. While 
coercive sterilization may be distinguished from abortion in that it 
involves the doctor’s direct bodily intrusion on her patient, this should 
be recognized as a relatively minor difference. Although the bodily 
intrusion itself is offensive, it is ultimately the fact that the doctor—or 
society—has usurped the woman’s reproductive decision-making that 
transforms both coercive sterilization and denial of abortion into acts 
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Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on April 7, 1948. Compelling a woman to 
continue with an unwanted pregnancy can have serious health consequences not only with 
respect to a woman’s physical well-being but also with respect to her mental health and 
socioeconomic welfare. By depriving women of the opportunity to make decisions about their 
bodies in a full range of circumstances, States impose consequences on women that may lead 
to severe pain and suffering—not only because a woman may suffer physical harm from 
continuing the pregnancy but because she may not have the socioeconomic means to bear and 
raise a child. These considerations should not be overlooked in human rights bodies’ CIDT 
analysis, and deserve further consideration in the relevant literature. I am indebted to Johanna 
Fine for these insights.  
156. See V.C. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 18968/07, ¶¶ 106–20 (2012); N.B. v. 
Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 29518/10, ¶¶ 71–88 (2012). 
157. V.C. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 18968/07, ¶ 118; N.B. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. No. 29518/10, ¶ 80. 
158. V.C. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 18968/07, ¶ 118; N.B. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. No. 29518/10, ¶ 80. 
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that “arouse . . . feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority” in women. 
Furthermore, the personal and social consequences that the European 
Court identified in the context of coercive sterilization, such as 
depression and social isolation, often arise in situations when women 
are denied an abortion, perhaps especially in contexts where abortion 
is heavily restricted and where attempting to access abortion for any 
reason is highly stigmatized.159 By recognizing that restrictive 
abortion laws contribute to social conditions that stigmatize and 
debase women for seeking an abortion, regardless of the reason, 
human rights bodies could significantly strengthen their 
understanding of the serious harms women experience in this context 
and improve human rights protections for women seeking to exercise 
their reproductive autonomy. 
C. Human Rights Bodies Have Recognized the Particular Pain 
Experienced by Women as Mothers Who Must Confront Their Future 
Child’s Potential Suffering 
In finding that denial of abortion or related services amounted to 
CIDT in specific cases, human rights bodies have repeatedly focused 
on the mental suffering of the women concerned, including that 
stemming specifically from their status as expectant mothers. The 
decisions in both K.L. and R.R. highlighted this particular type of 
suffering, at least in part because these were arguments raised by the 
applicants themselves.160 The Human Rights Committee and the 
European Court, respectively, picked up on both of these arguments, 
with the European Court fleshing it out more extensively in its 
analysis: 
Like any other pregnant woman in her situation, [R.R.] was 
deeply distressed by information that the foetus could be affected 
with some malformation. It was therefore natural that she wanted 
to obtain as much information as possible so as to find out 
whether the initial diagnosis was correct, and if so, what was the 
exact nature of the ailment. She also wanted to find out about the 
options available to her. As a result of the procrastination of the 
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159. For a case study of how restrictive abortion laws can lead to stigma, discrimination, 
and abuse against women seeking abortions, see Forsaken Lives: The Harmful Impact of the 
Philippine Criminal Abortion Ban, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (2010), http://
reproductiverights.org/en/forsakenlives. 
160. See Human Rights Comm., Commc'n., K.L. v. Peru, supra note 9, ¶¶ 3.4, 6.3; R.R. 
v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶ 147 (2011). 
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health professionals as described above, she had to endure weeks 
of painful uncertainty concerning the health of the foetus, her 
own and her family’s future and the prospect of raising a child 
suffering from an incurable ailment.161 
This passage from the R.R. opinion is notable for strategically 
framing R.R. as a mother concerned with the well-being of her 
unborn child, and whose pain and anguish arose in part from her 
concern for her family and its future, not necessarily from the denial 
of her autonomous decision-making. Certainly, the European Court of 
Human Rights was concerned with how R.R. herself was treated by 
the doctors—finding that they had humiliated her162—but the 
narrative of “woman as mother” is particularly strong in this case, as 
it is in K.L.163 
 The narrative of maternal pain or suffering is a fraught one. 
Feminist commentators have criticized international bodies for 
essentializing women as mothers and homemakers, framing them in 
“procreative and heterosexual terms.”164 Other commentators, 
however, have asserted that the “woman as mother” narrative might 
actually provide a fuller and more contextualized understanding of 
women’s lives than a concept of women as “free, independent, [and] 
individual,”165 unattached to family or community.166 Thus, the 
recognition of maternal pain in the context of CIDT may actually 
reveal an important dimension of female pain or suffering. It becomes 
problematic, however, if human rights bodies do not also recognize 
and address the independent pain or suffering a woman may 
experience from being denied the autonomous choice to terminate a 
pregnancy. Such a failure risks perpetuating stereotypes within 

161. R.R. v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 27617/04, ¶ 159. 
162. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
163. The Human Rights Committee in K.L. v. Peru observed that, “The author also 
claims that, owing to the refusal of the medical authorities to carry out the therapeutic 
abortion, she had to endure the distress of seeing her daughter’s marked deformities and 
knowing that she would die very soon . . . due weight must be given to the author’s 
complaints.” K.L., supra note 9, ¶ 6.3.  
164. Dianne Otto, A Post-Beijing Reflection on the Limitations and Potential of Human 
Rights Discourse for Women, in WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 115, 118 
(Kelly Askin & Dorean Koenig eds., 1999); see also EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 
supra note 1, at 71–73 (providing an overview of feminist critiques of human rights law as 
framing women as primarily mothers and homemakers). 
165. Radhika Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity and the 
Discourse of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 43, 55 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994). 
166. See EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 1, at 73. 
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international law about the proper role of women in society rather 
than providing a fuller understanding of how different situations 
implicate their human rights. This failure may be seen in the 
European Court of Human Rights cases: while the Court 
acknowledged the pain and suffering that R.R. experienced as an 
expectant mother concerned with her child’s well-being, it failed to 
recognize the severity of the pain and suffering that Tysiąc 
experienced when she feared the permanent loss of her eyesight yet 
could not obtain an abortion.   
CONCLUSION 
Human rights bodies’ recognition that State-sanctioned or State-
tolerated denials of abortion can amount to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment is an important development in human rights 
law; indeed, there do not appear to be many other examples where the 
denial of healthcare has been deemed to rise to the level of CIDT 
outside of detention contexts. Significantly, human rights bodies have 
found that States must take a number of steps to ensure that women 
are not subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the 
process of seeking reproductive healthcare, particularly abortion. 
First, States should ensure that rights guaranteed under domestic law 
are practically available and that women can vindicate their rights 
through a neutral procedural mechanism that reduces the risk of abuse 
in the healthcare system. Second, States that prohibit and criminalize 
abortion in most or all circumstances should enact exceptions to allow 
for abortion in cases where continuing with the pregnancy poses 
severe risks of physical or mental harm to the woman, such as in 
cases of rape, fetal abnormalities, or when the woman’s life is at 
stake. These findings reflect an understanding that certain restrictions 
on abortion—or the State’s failure to act to prevent de facto 
restrictions from arising—are unjustifiable and disproportionate to 
lawful State aims. Furthermore, they signal a growing recognition by 
human rights bodies that deprivations of autonomy in the 
reproductive rights context can lead to the kind of pain and suffering 
that is unacceptable and intolerable in modern societies. While these 
bodies have not embraced a fully developed understanding of the 
ways in which depriving women of autonomous decision-making in 
the abortion context can implicate CIDT, they have made important 
strides and have established a foundation for further development of 
this doctrine. 
